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The history of technology has never been properly established in New 
Zealand. We have general histories that refer to industrial or technological 
progress to a greater or lesser degree; we have accounts (often from 
amateurs) of speciﬁc industries; we have ʻlightʼ accounts of our No. 8 
wire culture; but we do not have either a dedicated general history or 
a group of professionals solely dedicated to the task of researching our 
technological heritage, explaining that heritage to their peers and the wider 
public, and training graduate students to write technological history. New 
Zealand requires a new disciplinary focus on the history of technology, 
in order to rationalize our scattered resources, deﬁne a generally accepted 
methodological approach and (most importantly, perhaps) provoke debate. 
There have been fundamental changes in social and governmental attitudes 
towards technology in the last decade, and we need to ﬁnd a way to engage 
with the topic in an informed and intelligent manner.
Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc
Whatever the difﬁculties (and there are many) in properly establishing the 
history of technology as a sub-discipline in New Zealand, therefore, one 
point is beyond dispute: despite fundamental problems of deﬁnition, modern 
society is highly conscious of ʻtechnology ,ʼ and the historical profession 
would be remiss not to enter into public discourse on the matter. As Leo 
Marx and Merritt Roe Smith1 point out, technology not only plays a central 
role in our everyday lives, but also popular narratives that are absolutely 
central to our understanding of the past rely upon it for verisimilitude. 
Undergraduate topics as varied as colonization, religion, revolution and trade 
rely upon technology as a fundamental hinge in their logical structure: just 
as the New World is commonly said to have been discovered because of 
the invention of the compass, so the Reformation is said to have resulted 
from access to Gutenberg sʼ printing press, the American Civil War from 
the cotton-gin (which dramatically increased the commercial viability of 
slaves) and the economic development of New Zealand from the advent 
of refrigeration. Although vaguely disconcerting to historians, these ʻmini-
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fables ,ʼ with their ʻsimple yet highly plausible before-and-after narrative 
structure[s]ʼ2 go largely unquestioned in survey courses, scholarly articles 
and general histories alike; it is as though our profession is willing to elide 
the most basic methodological imperatives learnt in honours classes and 
gathered from supervisors while writing theses, in the interests of narrative 
consistency. When it comes to the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, 
technology appears to get a free pass (otherwise we would not read such 
apparently innocuous statements as ʻThe automobile created suburbiaʼ or 
ʻThe Pill produced a sexual revolutionʼ).
Of course, there is a high probability that many historians have simply 
put technology in the ʻtoo hardʼ basket. There is general agreement amongst 
both philosophers and historians of technology, for instance, that we have 
only a thin grasp of just what the word ʻtechnologyʼ refers to, despite the 
1990s witnessing use of the term to an extent that is unprecedented in 
human history. The problem is that, rather than being a collective noun 
which refers to a ﬁnite group of material artefacts (such as, most recently, 
computers), ʻtechnologyʼ has taken on all the attributes of an adjective 
lacking an identiﬁable essence; the term ʻtechnologicalʼ ﬂoats freely in 
both conversation and academic discourse, but never refers to a concrete 
and identiﬁable body of material objects. Indeed, ʻtechnologyʼ is frequently 
used to refer not only to material objects, but also to practices like writing 
and even cognitive processes like psychoanalysis; some would suggest that 
the term has become so ubiquitous as to simply refer to anything that is 
suggestive of human sentience and our ability to transform the world we 
live in.
Martin Heidegger referred to this quality in his seminal essay ʻThe 
Question Concerning Technologyʼ3 when he suggested that the most 
important thing about technology was its ever-shifting essence, or ʻisness .ʼ 
Heidegger sʼ genius was to note (after failing to describe the term to his 
satisfaction) that the essence of the term is more important than the term 
itself, because it provides people with the possibility of inﬁnite logical 
regression, wherein the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy can ﬂourish. In 
Heidegger, both the signiﬁcance of technology and our fear of it lies in our 
inability to deﬁne it; at some level we are aware that we cannot control 
that which we cannot deﬁne. This ʻthingʼ called technology thus appears to 
rule our lives, even though it may not – in any concrete sense of the term 
– even exist. At this level of extreme philosophical reduction, ʻtechnologyʼ 
merely appears as a shadow of human sentience (or Being) itself.
This rather obtuse perspective can be backed up through etymology. As 
the American cultural historian Leo Marx noted, the term is of extremely 
recent origin, and has consistently confounded attempts at deﬁnition. His 
essay ʻTechnology – The Emergence of a Hazardous Conceptʼ 4 suggests that 
the word did not enter into common usage until the twentieth century, after 
being incubated for over a century in our institutions of higher learning. 
It was ﬁrst used in America in 1828 by the Boston botanist and physician 
Jacob Bigelow, to address the socio-cultural and industrial implications 
of the ﬁrst industrial revolution, and employed by him in an address to 
Harvard University about the future of science. Like Thorstein Veblen, who 
popularized the term later in the nineteenth century and directly associated 
it with the more nuanced German notion of technik (from the Greek 
techne),5 Bigelow suggested that technology – or the exponential increase 
in the study and application of what were then known as the mechanical 
arts – had become the driving force behind science, and would continue to 
be so for the foreseeable future. From its inception, ʻtechnologyʼ referred 
to a melange of features peculiar to the industrial revolution, but remained 
indeﬁnable in its particulars. It merely referred to an obscure combination 
of scientiﬁc techniques and industrial processes that had somehow begun 
to determine the course of history, and hence our lives; it has never had a 
concrete referent beyond the identiﬁcation of a generalized, and increasingly 
global, episteme.6
Prior to the industrial revolution, people referred to artefacts created 
by humans and employed for efﬁciency or pleasure as ʻmachines ,ʼ and the 
processes by which those machines were created as the ʻmechanical arts .ʼ 
Rather than being indeﬁnable and possibly uncontrollable, machines were 
solidly under the control of their human operators. As late as 1931, Harry 
Holland published a pamphlet in New Zealand titled ʻThe Machine: Friend of 
Man – or Rivalʼ ,7 evoking images of automobiles, cranes, combine harvesters 
and myriad other devices. Signiﬁcantly, the question for Holland was not 
whether or not machines were beginning to determine human actions, but 
whether humankind was well served to rely on them so much as labour-
saving devices: the issue was related to unemployment and the possibility 
of moral and physical degeneracy rather than a fundamental issue of social 
control. Holland sʼ readers still had a choice, in other words. If his pamphlet 
was titled ʻTechnology: Friend of Man – or Rivalʼ , the tone might have been 
altered substantially.
In America, the term ʻtechnologyʼ was coming into widespread use 
when Holland wrote his pamphlet. The deployment of electrical light and 
power, automobiles, cinema, aircraft and telephones at the close of the 
second industrial revolution provided the core of what commentators like 
Henry Adams referred to as a ʻmaterial coreʼ for a vast, complex, yet ill-
deﬁned ʻsociotechnologicalʼ 8 system. Adams noted the appearance of a new 
American, born after 1900, who would grow up in a vaguely menacing world 
of technology. Cultural critics were beginning to suggest that technology 
would replace politics at the core of society, and that the socio-technological 
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system would eventually become self-perpetuating and deterministic. (In 
wilder moments, there were even suggestions – which continue today – that 
it would become aware.)9 Unlike Holland, who felt that machines simply 
presented humanity with rational choices, commentators like Adams felt 
that machines were capable of rendering human agency redundant. The 
point to note here is that the term ʻtechnologyʼ arose in combination with 
the social and cultural upheaval associated with the industrial revolution; 
its famous indeterminacy was a direct result of its genesis in the midst of 
an epistemological crisis.
It is necessary, therefore, to deal with the notion of technological 
determinism: the belief that the various material artefacts of the modern age 
(electric lights, automobiles, refrigeration units, computers) actually drive 
social and cultural progress. The centrality of this ʻsuperstitionʼ10 to the 
history of technology cannot be understated; it is implicit in the etymology 
of the term outlined above, and many historians of technology appear to 
believe that debunking it is their sole reason for existence. Technology, 
of course, does not drive history; even Karl Marx did not believe this. 
(It is reasonably widely accepted that he viewed it as one of a number of 
determinative forces, of which the whole was far greater than the sum of its 
parts.)11 As M. L. Smith categorically points out, any belief that technology 
drives social and cultural progress is so wrong-headed as to ʻupend the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics, conjuring up a non-entropic universe 
in which dust never settles, things cohere and grow supple with time, and 
everything is always new and improved, forever young .ʼ12
Historians of technology are increasingly turning to an approach which 
moves along a spectrum from ʻhardʼ to ʻsoftʼ determinism, but which in 
almost all cases is balanced with a mode of ʻthick descriptionʼ which 
complements mechanical descriptions with a broad cultural or socio-
technological perspective. At the ʻhardʼ end of the spectrum, technological 
artefacts may indeed be seen in an inherently determinative light, but 
usually only insofar as human choice is either extended or curtailed by the 
technologies available to them. At the sʻoftʼ end of the spectrum, the artefacts 
may only be used in a symbolic sense, as aids to narrative consistency and a 
methodological tool that allows the historian to ʻgain entranceʼ to an under-
researched aspect of a culture sʼ past. Technological artefacts are, therefore, 
located within the societies which produced and made them in an effort to 
describe the culture sʼ relationship to technology, providing descriptions of 
the culture sʼ different (and almost always ambiguous) attitudes towards those 
artefacts. In some cases (such as America and, I would argue, New Zealand), 
cultures may base a signiﬁcant part of their identity around technological 
progress and closely identify with the notion of technological determinism; 
in other cases (such as pre-contact indigenous Australians and some South 
American tribes), technology might appear in their cultural traditions only 
as something practical that has strictly limited symbolic power.
This is a sea-change in approach. Historians of technology have 
traditionally refused to look outside the ʻblack-box ,ʼ13 and relate the arcana 
of ﬂy-wheels, structural supports and integrated circuits to the broader socio-
cultural context. Works such as the eight-volume A History of Technology14 
spent a great deal of time explaining, in fascinating detail, that –
. . . [a]t the close of the nineteenth century the carbon ﬁlament lamp 
was in widespread use and a metal ﬁlament lamp, using osmium, had 
been introduced in 1898. The bayonet cap lampholder used in Britain 
and the screw cap lampholder preferred in America had both become 
standard. The carbon ﬁlament lamp gave an average light output of 
about 1:4 lumens per watt in 1900, and had a life expectancy of 400-500 
hours15 –
but very little time relating that content to the broader world of users, 
whose lives were heavily impacted by this new technology, at home, in 
the workplace and in the global economic markets. Working hours were 
extended, neighbourhoods divided and moral panics relating to the loss of 
natural daily rhythms and the possibility of moral degeneracy swept societies 
across the world. Although the great efforts of ʻtraditionalʼ  historians of 
technology have provided us with a wealth of source material and accurate 
technical description, the fact is that prior to 1970, many historians of 
technology would have been more suited to engineering departments than 
history departments. Works like Lewis Mumford sʼ Technics and Civilization16 
and Jacques Ellulʼ s The Technological Society17 provide socially-oriented 
parallels to the tradition of ʻblack-boxʼ histories represented by the Clarendon 
project, but these were not informed by historical method in the strictest 
sense; Mumford was a literary and cultural critic and Ellul was a (highly 
deterministic) philosopher. For most of the twentieth century, historians 
of technology were involved in the necessary and painstaking task of 
recording mechanical, industrial and chemical developments through time, 
and the diffusion of these technologies through space.18 Writers have only 
recently decided that the volume of information is great enough and the 
subject relevant enough to sustain technological histories with a broader, 
less pragmatic, purpose in mind.19
This could be put down to the huge increase in awareness about 
technology since the internet and World Wide Web boom of the 1990s, but 
investigation into this matter remains the domain of sociologists and cultural 
critics. What is of signiﬁcance for New Zealand history is the way in which 
the history of technology might allow the accepted history of Aotearoa-New 
Zealand to be re-imagined and re-contextualized. Technology provides a 
new perspective on our past that it seems apposite to develop, especially 
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given the simple fact that our country sʼ post-European settlement occurred 
in the midst of both the ﬁrst and second industrial revolutions.20 Within 
100 years (1800-1900), we leapt from a pre-modern culture to one of the 
most industrialized in the world, permanently obfuscating what came before 
and continually making a connection in our culture and politics between 
those three pillars of the modern colonizing powers: progress, industry and 
technology.
Most historians would accept that there are major holes in the fabric 
of that story, especially when it is remembered that Maori had a degree 
of agency on ﬁrst contact that they sometimes took advantage of; that 
European colonists were often vulnerable, alienated and at odds with their 
environment; that government initiatives often failed miserably at the same 
time as bridges were built, ports established and railways laid; and that many 
colonists probably came to New Zealand out of a strong desire to avoid the 
pitfalls of modern life that technology had apparently caused in the Old 
World.21 We require a general history of technology that deconstructs the 
myths of progress that we have so tightly bound to notions of technological 
advance. Culture and society can move ʻbackwardsʼ just as easily as we can 
ﬁnd ourselves using poorly designed, unethical and frustrating technologies, 
and a heightened awareness of this can greatly assist our interpretation of 
the past.
Without having a prior New Zealand model to work from, it is difﬁcult to 
envisage just what any general history of technology in this country would 
look like, but recent overseas publications provide some possibilities. While 
some might complain that my proposed approach is too broad, and some 
that it is too narrowly focused upon technology, three overseas publications 
would suggest that there is no single ʻacceptedʼ approach to the subject 
at present. While certainly not representing a cross-section of current 
approaches, Thomas J. Misa sʼ Leonardo to the Internet,22 Jenny Uglow sʼ 
The Lunar Men: Five Friends Whose Curiosity Changed the World 23 and 
Richard Dawkins sʼ The Ancestorʼs Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of 
Evolution suggest that the ﬁeld has been thrown open to any number of 
approaches.24 Misa uses a series of central determining contexts (such as 
Renaissance patronage) to describe the circuitous route from the engineering 
and military marvels of Leonardo da Vinci to the development of the 
internet from the 1960s, using comparative analysis of his cultural settings 
to provide balance and an extremely engaging level of insight. Uglow relates 
the friendship of ﬁve men who were crucial to the industrial revolution of 
the nineteenth century (Matthew Boulton, James Watt, Josiah Wedgwood, 
Erasmus Darwin and Joseph Priestley) in an inventive attempt at collective 
biography. And Richard Dawkins, in inimical style, inverts the traditional 
historical narrative and moves backward in time to chart the (inverted) 
evolution of homo sapiens sapiens from the evolutionary pool. Mirroring 
the current climate in science and technology itself, historians of technology 
are employing various and innovative techniques in their approaches to the 
past. Historians of technology now appear able to balance not only ʻhardʼ 
or ʻsoftʼ determinism and/or technical and cultural content, but also play 
with narrative linearity and collective biography. The subject has suddenly 
exploded any methodological strictures and become (like many subjects 
across the humanities) open to multitudinous approaches.
Recent approaches to technology education in New Zealand present another 
possible perspective, based on research that has burgeoned worldwide since 
the year 2000. Following (and in some senses anticipating) global trends, the 
subject is now a well-established part of our secondary curriculum, and has 
recently been accepted as a subject for University Entrance.25 Revealingly 
(and happily, for humanists), achievement criteria focus on what are termed 
technological ʻoutcomes ,ʼ26 allowing teachers to focus on a whole range of 
issues related to the design, socio-historical contexts, ethics and functions 
of different technologies. Like this essay, which suggests a ʻsoftʼ cultural 
approach to the subject to make best use of our present capacities and also 
(it is hoped) to prompt a more thorough-going approach to the subject in the 
future, educationalists employ a broad approach to technology, conceiving 
it ʻas a process in which people are involved in order to meet a need or 
opportunityʼ – a process which results in an exceptionally broad range of 
technological outcomes.27 Although open to charges of reductionism, the 
approach represents an important direction for historians of technology.28 
Signiﬁcantly, a focus on the processes that are involved in the development 
of different technological ʻoutcomesʼ allows us to examine both technological 
artefacts and technological systems. This is an important distinction to 
be able to make, especially when referring to contemporary technologies. 
As the American historian of technology Thomas Hughes has shown, 
the great technological breakthroughs of the post-World War Two world 
were only possible because of the development of systems that enabled 
scientists and engineers to cope with the ʻunprecedented complexityʼ29 of 
technological projects such as the American ATLAS missile project and, 
more recently, the Boston (USA) Central Artery/Tunnel. If we refer only 
to technological artefacts, in the older tradition of technological history, we 
miss a fundamental aspect of post-1945 scientiﬁc and engineering practice. 
A proper understanding of ʻtechnology ,ʼ then, demands an understanding 
of processes, systems and outcomes. In this sense, the modern discipline 
lies at the interface between culture, design and implementation, presenting 
humanists with an opportunity to position themselves at the centre of a 
rapidly developing ﬁeld.30
Journal of New Zealand Studies ‘The History of Technology and the History of New Zealand’
116 117
given the simple fact that our country sʼ post-European settlement occurred 
in the midst of both the ﬁrst and second industrial revolutions.20 Within 
100 years (1800-1900), we leapt from a pre-modern culture to one of the 
most industrialized in the world, permanently obfuscating what came before 
and continually making a connection in our culture and politics between 
those three pillars of the modern colonizing powers: progress, industry and 
technology.
Most historians would accept that there are major holes in the fabric 
of that story, especially when it is remembered that Maori had a degree 
of agency on ﬁrst contact that they sometimes took advantage of; that 
European colonists were often vulnerable, alienated and at odds with their 
environment; that government initiatives often failed miserably at the same 
time as bridges were built, ports established and railways laid; and that many 
colonists probably came to New Zealand out of a strong desire to avoid the 
pitfalls of modern life that technology had apparently caused in the Old 
World.21 We require a general history of technology that deconstructs the 
myths of progress that we have so tightly bound to notions of technological 
advance. Culture and society can move ʻbackwardsʼ just as easily as we can 
ﬁnd ourselves using poorly designed, unethical and frustrating technologies, 
and a heightened awareness of this can greatly assist our interpretation of 
the past.
Without having a prior New Zealand model to work from, it is difﬁcult to 
envisage just what any general history of technology in this country would 
look like, but recent overseas publications provide some possibilities. While 
some might complain that my proposed approach is too broad, and some 
that it is too narrowly focused upon technology, three overseas publications 
would suggest that there is no single ʻacceptedʼ approach to the subject 
at present. While certainly not representing a cross-section of current 
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approach represents an important direction for historians of technology.28 
Signiﬁcantly, a focus on the processes that are involved in the development 
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artefacts and technological systems. This is an important distinction to 
be able to make, especially when referring to contemporary technologies. 
As the American historian of technology Thomas Hughes has shown, 
the great technological breakthroughs of the post-World War Two world 
were only possible because of the development of systems that enabled 
scientists and engineers to cope with the ʻunprecedented complexityʼ29 of 
technological projects such as the American ATLAS missile project and, 
more recently, the Boston (USA) Central Artery/Tunnel. If we refer only 
to technological artefacts, in the older tradition of technological history, we 
miss a fundamental aspect of post-1945 scientiﬁc and engineering practice. 
A proper understanding of ʻtechnology ,ʼ then, demands an understanding 
of processes, systems and outcomes. In this sense, the modern discipline 
lies at the interface between culture, design and implementation, presenting 
humanists with an opportunity to position themselves at the centre of a 
rapidly developing ﬁeld.30
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The Study of Technology in New Zealand
One of the ﬁrst issues that the history of technology raises relates to the 
exceptionally large source base present in any national archives. A quick and 
unscientiﬁc keyword search on the University of Canterbury and National 
Library databases indicates the sheer volume of material that has some 
claim to a relationship with ʻtechnologicalʼ  history in our archives. Using 
22 different keyword terms ranging from ʻNew Zealand Technologyʼ to 
ʻNew Zealand Colonization ,ʼ ʻNew Zealand Agricultureʼ and ʻNew Zealand 
Antarctic ,ʼ it is possible to return over 16,734 results from the University 
of Canterbury system and over 210,000 from the National Library system. 
The ﬁgures are insigniﬁcant in terms of any kind of audit of the material 
available to future historians of technology in New Zealand, but they do 
point to an anomaly in our historiography: although there is a mass of 
evidentiary material available for a general history of technology in New 
Zealand (the above searches can presumably be considered to be the tip 
of an iceberg), this has never occurred. Indeed, despite the oft-cited ʻno. 8 
wireʼ31 component to our collective culture, technological history has never 
ﬁgured highly even in our existing general histories. Although arguably 
being a deﬁning feature of our culture (I would go so far as to suggest that 
New Zealand presents a useful case-study in technological nationalism), 
technology is largely absent as a focus of inquiry.32 As the ﬁgures indicate, 
this is not to suggest that we do not have resources that can be construed 
as falling within the ambit of ʻtechnological history ,ʼ but merely to point 
out that the sub-discipline does not exist in this country in any kind of 
deﬁned, organized or self-critical manner.
If the results from the online databases are cross-matched with an 
identical search through the index of the New Zealand Journal of History, 
the situation becomes clearer still, and suggests some immediate issues 
for New Zealand historians: in particular, the need for a generalized or 
ʻsoftʼ approach to the history of technology in this country.33 Although 
the content for a general history of technology in New Zealand is present 
(across the many associated ﬁelds), there are very few in-depth accounts 
to work with. Using the same keyword terms, it would appear as if only 
32 (out of a possible 286) articles published in the New Zealand Journal 
of History have any relation whatsoever to the history of technology, and 
only 82 (out of a possible 611) reviews. There are, of course, none that deal 
speciﬁcally with technology.
The point to these (reasonably subjective) investigations is twofold. Firstly, 
New Zealand history has a solid base of both primary and secondary sources 
that could be used in the service of histories of technology, and secondly, 
New Zealand historians have not engaged with the sub-discipline to any 
noticeable degree. Despite declarations that we have a no. 8 wire culture, 
our historical record is almost devoid of sustained investigations into that 
culture, and provides us with few useful models to base a general history 
of technology on. In suggesting what a general ʻHistory of Technology in 
New Zealandʼ might look like, we are forced to begin with a largely blank 
canvas.
The question over just where the history of technology might ﬁt within 
our present historiographical tradition remains, however. Jock Phillips 
undertook an in-depth stock-take of the New Zealand Journal of History 
in 1990, in an attempt to discern the ʻnew institutional supports and the 
recent methodological developmentsʼ34 amongst New Zealand historians, 
and found that the focus had shifted towards the twentieth century. For 
the previous ﬁve years (1985-1989), 45.9% of articles dealt with the period 
since 1910 and 21.9% with the period since 1940. Quite correctly, Phillips 
noted that ʻ[t]his reorientation of interest reﬂects a growing sense by New 
Zealand historians that their own immediate past [is] worth studying . . .ʼ ,35 
but again, this renewed interest in twentieth century history has done little 
to increase research into arguably the single most signiﬁcant aspect of 
twentieth century society: technology.
More recently, Tony Ballantyne and Brian Moloughney have called for a 
greater willingness to ʻdisrupt conventional readings of New Zealand history 
in order to open up issues for exploration and debate ,ʼ36 and Erik Olssen and 
Miles Fairburn have suggested that we need to ﬁnd subject-areas that are 
conducive to quantiﬁcation so that we can develop a general narrative that 
is capable of engendering ʻconsensusʼ37 within a methodologically-divided 
profession. The history of technology could help in both these regards, by 
opening up new areas for study and bonding the discipline through common 
interests across the socio-cultural continuum. Technological history is 
particularly conducive to large-scale data analysis and quantiﬁcation and has 
an association with social history in America,38 but also has applicability 
to cultural concerns. Indeed, the topic could enhance social, cultural and 
postcolonial approaches to the past.
For instance, Peter Gibbons has recently argued that the key to 
understanding New Zealand history lies in an assertion that European 
colonization is ongoing,39 and Chris Hilliard supported him in noting 
that Gibbons inaugurated the focus upon ʻcultural colonizationʼ in Pakeha 
writing and that this should now be extended into studies of the emotional 
states of New Zealanders.40 For most people, however, technology is far 
more indicative of colonization than the more intangible concerns of 
writing and emotional response.41 Indeed, the lack of interest on the part 
of postcolonial historians could be construed as extreme when it comes 
to technology. Whereas language underpins consciousness, and emotion 
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underpins human motivation, technology is, fundamentally, just used: to 
bargain with newcomers, to level forests, to enhance pastureland, to open 
new markets, to communicate with the world, to leave the country. In this 
sense, the history of technology is boring, but it is also attractive, because 
it will move us in a direction which is counter-intuitive to our intellectual 
traditions at the same time as it opens up the world of material artefacts for 
historical inspection. Like Eelco Runia, I feel that the study of objects can 
complement the historical representationalism encouraged by Gibbons with 
a more traditional appreciation of historical ʻpresenceʼ which tends towards 
metonymy rather than irony.42 In the twenty-ﬁrst century, it may well be that 
historians of technology provide new ways of writing history, by refocusing 
attention on the fundamentally material nature of historical reality. Such an 
approach allows for social, cultural and postcolonial approaches.
Indeed, the history of technology has the ability to add value to various 
different historical perspectives. While the postcolonial emphasis upon 
cultural colonization seems to imply that technology is perhaps the ultimate 
in colonizing agents (writing fades into insigniﬁcance as an act that merely 
borrows the term), feminist historians can rightly note that technology has 
traditionally acted as a determinant of the division of society into the private/
public spheres, at the same time as mastery and control of it have been 
axiomatic to masculinist cultures around the world. The technology industry 
is, after all, probably the most heavily gendered domain in contemporary 
society, pulling with it centuries of cultural baggage laden with the male 
domination of tools and machines; the most world- (and some would say 
consciousness-) transforming cultural artefacts we deploy.43 To put the matter 
crudely, tools and technology have been used to deﬁne us as a species, and 
are therefore laden with an extremely powerful set of cultural practices, 
assumptions and power relations.
Research Perspectives in New Zealand
Of course, many historians simply ﬁnd the history of technology unexciting; 
it conjures up images of dusty lecture halls and endless images of sixteenth-
century windmill parts. If the history of technology is to be rehabilitated as 
a sub-discipline – a process which could increase our claims to legitimacy 
in the context of early twenty-ﬁrst-century society – it needs to speak to the 
concerns of the discipline as a whole. It needs to be capable of speaking to 
New Zealand sʼ status as a society which was ʻborn modern ,ʼ44 it needs to 
explicate imperial and other transnational bonds which contributed to the 
colonization process, and it needs to ﬁt comfortably within our dominant 
tradition of social and cultural history. Luckily, the history of technology 
is extremely well suited to all of these concerns and could open up some 
very large areas of research across the entire span of New Zealand history. 
Without wanting to be prescriptive (and simultaneously displaying my 
preference for a broadly cultural approach), I would suggest that the history 
of technology in New Zealand follows the following general parameters: 
Pre-Contact: 1350-1642; Contact: 1642-1840; Colonization: 1840-1873; 
Colonial Nationalism: 1873-1914; Industrialization: 1914-1945; Nationalization 
1945-1984; and Postmodern Globalization 1984-2006. Although I can 
provide only some very basic sketches here, I would suggest that there are 
some major technological questions that need to be asked in each of these 
periods.
Pre-Contact: 1350-1642
In many ways, this period could be termed ʻarchaeologicalʼ  and therefore 
outside the orbit of historians, but this is an unreasonable approach in 
terms of the history of technology. The Polynesian diaspora that led to the 
discovery and subsequent colonization of New Zealand was, fundamentally, 
a technological affair: it was predicated upon technological innovations in 
ship-building and navigation; it relied upon horticultural technologies both 
for the long voyages and for the adaptation of plants on arrival; the New 
Zealand environment demanded technological adaptation in terms of housing 
and clothing; the development of trade networks necessitated new methods 
of extraction and manufacturing; new modes of warfare led to innovations 
and advances in fortiﬁcation and battle technologies; and the new inhabitants 
contributed to fundamental changes to both the landscape and ﬂora and 
fauna. If a single question was to be posited about the pre-contact period, 
it might simply be, ʻWhat relationship did pre-contact Maori have with 
technology, and what role did technology play in the ﬁrst colonization of 
New Zealand?ʼ
Contact: 1642-1840
The history of European exploration and discovery lends itself easily to 
the history of technology; it is also a fundamental strand in the ʻborn 
modernʼ thesis. Much of the power of the narrative stems from the 
convergence of a powerful set of contingent historical processes, anchored 
around Enlightenment advances in science and philosophy and illustrated 
by developments in navigation, cartography, ship-building, medicine and 
food preservation.45 It is a grand story with sometimes horriﬁc results. 
As Anne Salmond has shown, however, the story need not be one-sided.46 
A good history of technology in New Zealand would also assess the role 
of technology in the establishment of Maori-Pakeha relations during ﬁrst 
contact, alongside the relatively fast uptake of western technologies within 
Maori societies, and the effect of those technologies on wider Maori society 
(symbolized most forcefully in the Musket Wars, but in myriad other subtle 
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ways as well). In this period, technological history intersects with economic 
history, not only in relation to the bartering associated with ﬁrst contact, 
but also to the development of sealing and whaling stations and, later, food 
production, housing and even distilling. Myriad questions could be asked, 
but the most enticing is, ʻWhat role did technology play in the shifting 
balance of power between Maori and Pakeha prior to organized European 
settlement in 1840?ʼ
Colonization: 1840-1873
James Belich has provided us with an excellent account of the impact 
of technology on Maori colonial societies, and the way in which Maori 
society adapted to western technologies both socially and militarily, but far 
more could be done if the history of technology was viewed as a distinct 
project, rather than a sideline to military, cultural or social history.47 The 
transference of technology and technological expertise to New Zealand in 
the period after 1840 was, arguably, unprecedented in human history. In 
the 30 or so years after the start of programmatic European settlement, a 
rudimentary but highly effective colonial infrastructure had been established, 
with extensively explored and surveyed land; the burgeoning of houses, roads, 
ports, factories and basic sewage systems; and the beginnings of railways, 
tunnels, mines and even telegraphic communication with the rest of the 
world. It is easy to overstate both the rapidity of technological advance 
and its role as a determining agent in the colonization of New Zealand, but 
there can be little doubt that Maori and Pakeha societies felt the impact of 
technological advance in stark terms. Unlike Europe, where science, accident 
and inquisitiveness coalesced over hundreds of years into the Industrial 
Revolution (which even under these circumstances provoked widespread 
social and cultural unease), New Zealanders witnessed the development of 
a skeletal technological (if not industrial) infrastructure in a mere 30 years. 
What social, cultural and intellectual dynamics were involved in this act of 
technological colonization? Miles Fairburn sʼ suggestion that New Zealand sʼ 
European settlement was delayed until ʻa crucial point in the development 
of world historyʼ 48 is clearly ripe for investigation from the perspective of 
technological history, as is Tony Ballantyne sʼ identiﬁcation of technology as 
a key component in the development of ʻproto-globalization .ʼ49
Colonial Nationalism: 1873-1914
It is interesting that historians have yet to comment in depth on the relationship 
between colonial nationalism and claims of European autochthony, and 
technology. The Vogelite reforms of the 1870s were predicated almost 
solely upon the need to develop New Zealand sʼ rudimentary technological 
infrastructure quickly into one that could both sustain higher levels of 
immigration and greater levels of industrial output. As the gold-rushes died 
out, it became necessary to move from a laissez-faire model of technological 
development to a programmatic, state-sponsored one, which could employ 
economies of scale to transform the landscape (and townscapes) radically 
with modern ports, railways, roads and communities. The problems and 
reversals of this period in our technological history need to be assessed 
alongside governmental claims of unmitigated progress: the uneconomic 
expense; the disregard of Maori society and increasing calls for land; 
questionable work practices on public works projects; environmental damage 
and hopeless attempts at biological control; and, not least, the competing 
claims of the Arcadian and ʻsocial laboratoryʼ tropes within a wider political 
discourse of technological triumphalism. What role did technology play in 
the growth of settler dominance, and how important were futurism and 
technological triumphalism to late nineteenth-century New Zealand?
Industrialization: 1914-1945
Not enough is known about the industrialization of New Zealand. Alongside 
the obvious socio-cultural implications of this process (urbanization, changes 
in gender relations, alterations in national identity), it would be necessary 
to assess both the rate and nature of industrialization. Was the rate of 
industrialization faster or slower in New Zealand in comparison to other 
western societies? How did New Zealand compensate for distance and 
did this have any measurable effect on the type of industrial society that 
evolved? What effect did the wars have on industrialization and technological 
change in New Zealand? What differences were there between urban and 
rural experiences of technological change? Many of these questions have 
been approached by earlier historians, who appear to have been interested in 
industrialization;50 by economic historians;51 by environmental historians of 
the ʻgrasslands revolution ;ʼ52 and by a 600-page PhD thesis on the topic;53 but 
the information has never been brought together into an accessible general 
narrative written by a historian dedicated to the history of technology. 
Cultural historians should be particularly interested in Patrick Day sʼ writing 
on the radio stock boom of the 1920s on New Zealand:54 a world-wide 
phenomenon comparable in impact to the dotcom bubble of the 1990s 
that must have had a huge globalizing effect on our culture.55 Indeed, the 
interwar electronics boom – including the remarkable number of cinemas 
in 1930s New Zealand56 – is of enduring interest as an analogy for the 
present boom in computer technologies, and as a process that should be 
capable of shedding signiﬁcant light on New Zealandersʼ identiﬁcation not 
only with technology, but also with its capacity for reducing distance to 
the outside world.
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Nationalization: 1945-1984
Most historians view the post-war era as one of insularity and provincialism 
in both culture and politics, but it would be interesting to investigate whether 
our technological development mirrors this narrative. In certain circumstances, 
the answer will undoubtedly be ʻyesʼ – Muldoonism and ʻThink Bigʼ being 
the most obvious symbols of this attitude – but there are very many instances 
where technology did precisely the opposite. Increases in the efﬁciency 
of ports and general shipping processes, the advent of jet travel and the 
appearance of television (to note only the most obvious examples) worked 
precisely against the provincial attitudes that are traditionally remarked 
upon by historians. A history of technology would probably foreground 
the way in which our culture was dominated by imported technologies 
which contributed to a vast variety of processes, such as the growth of 
counter-culture and youth politics, a growth in demographic diversity and 
multiculturalism, and the boom in tertiary education. Technology was 
involved in all of these processes, and at each level, the implied narrative 
shifts focus away from the typical themes of insularity and provincialism 
towards global engagement and innovation. More negatively (but equally 
conducive to Fairburn sʼ argument that New Zealand culture had borrowed 
heavily from overseas because of its geographic isolation57), technology 
was also implicated in the gendering of the domestic sphere and the cult of 
motherhood during the 1950s; a dramatic rise in road deaths and problems 
with drink driving from the late 1960s; economic ʻstagﬂationʼ in the 1970s; 
and, arguably, the degree of violence experienced during the Springbok Tour 
of 1981. Its failure was symbolized most forcefully in the Erebus disaster of 
1979. The key questions here relate to the role of technology in mitigating 
(or compounding) New Zealandersʼ sense of isolation, its effect on national 
identity, and its involvement in cultural and political programmes.
Postmodern Globalization: 1984-2006
As their narratives near the end of the twentieth century, the great danger 
for historians of technology is that they might begin to attribute more 
determinative power to technology than it actually merits and forget that their 
subject is involved in some extremely long and complex historical trends58 
(many of which are not the sole domain of the West).59 A good history 
of technology would point out to readers that the current fascination with 
information and communication technologies (and claims that they auger the 
end of history) are misinformed. Indeed, the sub-discipline sʼ ability to present 
the longue durèe should make it attractive to scholars like Tony Ballantyne 
who want to position New Zealand society within broader processes of 
cultural, intellectual and technological development.60 It is important that 
technological development is adequately historicized, and that historians point 
out just how postmodern globalization actually functions: it is as important 
to note developments in urban planning, building and shipping technologies 
as it is nano-technology and bio-engineering.
That said, and like the rest of the world, post-1984 New Zealand has 
been buffeted by successive waves of technological innovation of a material, 
digital and systemic nature. Of particular interest is the way technology has 
facilitated national dialogues on subjects as varied as environmentalism, 
Maori land claims, feminism, our anti-nuclear stance and student loans. 
Talkback radio hosts and website editors now hold a degree of power 
that former governments would have baulked at, and children, adolescents 
and adults alike have relationships that span the globe – with people they 
have never met. Even the much publicized ʻbraindrainʼ61 is entangled with 
technological change in quite fundamental ways, and the government is now 
publicizing a Digital Strategy to cope with signiﬁcant alterations in the way 
we work, learn and play.62 Unsurprisingly, it is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd examples 
where New Zealanders appear concerned about technological advance. The 
post-Netscape boom in internet technology of the late 1990s has created 
a degree of unease throughout our society that would be termed ʻmoral 
panicʼ if noted in a past society: concern about online ʻstranger dangerʼ 
is one quite reasonable reaction; concern about an imminent ʻsingularityʼ63 
which could see computing networks attaining consciousness is something 
else altogether, and reminiscent of prior fears about railways, telegraphs 
and electricity grids. Like many societies around the world, New Zealand 
needs to ask itself how it reacted to technological innovations in the past 
in order to make sense of its concerns in the present. A renewed interest in 
the history of technology, and in particular the radically contingent nature 
of technological outcomes, should facilitate this.
Conclusion
Few sub-disciplines within history can fully defend themselves against claims 
of presentism, and the history of technology might have more difﬁculty 
than most. In the space of a few decades, technology has become a central 
focus of the media, workplaces, schools, universities and polytechnics; it is 
a subject that has a remarkable amount of currency in our present cultural 
environment. Yet, despite this – and despite the fact that the history of 
technology has a reasonably aged and substantial historiographical tradition 
stretching back to the post-war era – the sub-discipline has never taken hold 
in this country. The reasons for this are many, varied and understandable, 
but it is time for a revaluation of the place of technology in our narratives. 
Our historiographical tradition is deep enough now to sustain another level 
of specialization, and there could be few more pointedly relevant topics 
today than the venerable history of technology. Although much of our 
Journal of New Zealand Studies ‘The History of Technology and the History of New Zealand’
124 125
Nationalization: 1945-1984
Most historians view the post-war era as one of insularity and provincialism 
in both culture and politics, but it would be interesting to investigate whether 
our technological development mirrors this narrative. In certain circumstances, 
the answer will undoubtedly be ʻyesʼ – Muldoonism and ʻThink Bigʼ being 
the most obvious symbols of this attitude – but there are very many instances 
where technology did precisely the opposite. Increases in the efﬁciency 
of ports and general shipping processes, the advent of jet travel and the 
appearance of television (to note only the most obvious examples) worked 
precisely against the provincial attitudes that are traditionally remarked 
upon by historians. A history of technology would probably foreground 
the way in which our culture was dominated by imported technologies 
which contributed to a vast variety of processes, such as the growth of 
counter-culture and youth politics, a growth in demographic diversity and 
multiculturalism, and the boom in tertiary education. Technology was 
involved in all of these processes, and at each level, the implied narrative 
shifts focus away from the typical themes of insularity and provincialism 
towards global engagement and innovation. More negatively (but equally 
conducive to Fairburn sʼ argument that New Zealand culture had borrowed 
heavily from overseas because of its geographic isolation57), technology 
was also implicated in the gendering of the domestic sphere and the cult of 
motherhood during the 1950s; a dramatic rise in road deaths and problems 
with drink driving from the late 1960s; economic ʻstagﬂationʼ in the 1970s; 
and, arguably, the degree of violence experienced during the Springbok Tour 
of 1981. Its failure was symbolized most forcefully in the Erebus disaster of 
1979. The key questions here relate to the role of technology in mitigating 
(or compounding) New Zealandersʼ sense of isolation, its effect on national 
identity, and its involvement in cultural and political programmes.
Postmodern Globalization: 1984-2006
As their narratives near the end of the twentieth century, the great danger 
for historians of technology is that they might begin to attribute more 
determinative power to technology than it actually merits and forget that their 
subject is involved in some extremely long and complex historical trends58 
(many of which are not the sole domain of the West).59 A good history 
of technology would point out to readers that the current fascination with 
information and communication technologies (and claims that they auger the 
end of history) are misinformed. Indeed, the sub-discipline sʼ ability to present 
the longue durèe should make it attractive to scholars like Tony Ballantyne 
who want to position New Zealand society within broader processes of 
cultural, intellectual and technological development.60 It is important that 
technological development is adequately historicized, and that historians point 
out just how postmodern globalization actually functions: it is as important 
to note developments in urban planning, building and shipping technologies 
as it is nano-technology and bio-engineering.
That said, and like the rest of the world, post-1984 New Zealand has 
been buffeted by successive waves of technological innovation of a material, 
digital and systemic nature. Of particular interest is the way technology has 
facilitated national dialogues on subjects as varied as environmentalism, 
Maori land claims, feminism, our anti-nuclear stance and student loans. 
Talkback radio hosts and website editors now hold a degree of power 
that former governments would have baulked at, and children, adolescents 
and adults alike have relationships that span the globe – with people they 
have never met. Even the much publicized ʻbraindrainʼ61 is entangled with 
technological change in quite fundamental ways, and the government is now 
publicizing a Digital Strategy to cope with signiﬁcant alterations in the way 
we work, learn and play.62 Unsurprisingly, it is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd examples 
where New Zealanders appear concerned about technological advance. The 
post-Netscape boom in internet technology of the late 1990s has created 
a degree of unease throughout our society that would be termed ʻmoral 
panicʼ if noted in a past society: concern about online ʻstranger dangerʼ 
is one quite reasonable reaction; concern about an imminent ʻsingularityʼ63 
which could see computing networks attaining consciousness is something 
else altogether, and reminiscent of prior fears about railways, telegraphs 
and electricity grids. Like many societies around the world, New Zealand 
needs to ask itself how it reacted to technological innovations in the past 
in order to make sense of its concerns in the present. A renewed interest in 
the history of technology, and in particular the radically contingent nature 
of technological outcomes, should facilitate this.
Conclusion
Few sub-disciplines within history can fully defend themselves against claims 
of presentism, and the history of technology might have more difﬁculty 
than most. In the space of a few decades, technology has become a central 
focus of the media, workplaces, schools, universities and polytechnics; it is 
a subject that has a remarkable amount of currency in our present cultural 
environment. Yet, despite this – and despite the fact that the history of 
technology has a reasonably aged and substantial historiographical tradition 
stretching back to the post-war era – the sub-discipline has never taken hold 
in this country. The reasons for this are many, varied and understandable, 
but it is time for a revaluation of the place of technology in our narratives. 
Our historiographical tradition is deep enough now to sustain another level 
of specialization, and there could be few more pointedly relevant topics 
today than the venerable history of technology. Although much of our 
Journal of New Zealand Studies ‘The History of Technology and the History of New Zealand’
126 127
technological history may prove to be rough and ready, it still speaks to 
our cultural practices and values, and the environment that helped shaped 
those practices and values. Indeed, the very fact that it is (or was) rough 
and ready is itself signiﬁcant when weighed alongside the impact Maori 
and European colonization had on these islands. Much can be achieved 
with ﬁre and ﬁshing nets, or indeed, a cross-cut saw, corrugated iron and 
hammer and nails.
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The Eyes Have It! Our Third Official 
Language: New Zealand Sign 
Language
RACHEL LOCKER McKEE
Victoria University of Wellington
New Zealand gained a third ofﬁcial (second statutory) language with the 
passage of the New Zealand Sign Language (NZSL) Act in April 2006. 
This landmark was heralded with elation by the Deaf community who have 
struggled for the right to exercise citizenship through a language that is fully 
accessible via the eyes. It is Deaf people sʼ visual orientation to the world that 
shapes their preference for sign language, structures their cultural experience 
and sets them apart as a community from the hearing majority.1
The achievement of ofﬁcial language status for NZSL is apparently 
unique among signed languages of the world; many national and state 
governments have accorded various forms of recognition to a signed 
language, but no others have ʻofficial languageʼ status.2 Why has the 
New Zealand government recognized NZSL as a third ofﬁcial language? 
Language policy makes and promotes certain choices about language use, 
against a backdrop of sociohistorical facts; such decisions thus have social 
meaning.3 Does the almost unanimous support for this Act signal heightened 
political sensitivity to issues of diversity, inclusiveness and equity? Or did 
the negligible material implications of the Act engender its passage as a 
compensatory gesture towards a disadvantaged community? Deaf New 
Zealanders have undoubtedly beneﬁted from the socio-political climate 
generated by the Maori Language Act 1987 and government commitment 
to the participatory rights of people with disabilities, as formalized in the 
New Zealand Disability Strategy.
This article critically examines the background, scope and likely impacts 
of the NZSL Act 2006, with comparative reference to the Maori Language 
Act (MLA) and cases of sign language recognition overseas. Consideration 
of the motives and process surrounding the NZSL Act shows that it is 
predicated on a hybrid ideology which draws upon principles of human 
rights, disability rights and minority linguistic rights, to re-position the 
status of NZSL users symbolically and promote their right to societal 
participation.
